AI Agent Security Assessment
Ayliea (informed by MITRE ATLAS 2026.06 agentic AI updates)·1.0
Agents are different. A chatbot answers a question; an agent runs commands, calls APIs, and writes code on your customer's behalf. The risk surface — delegated authority, tool invocation, agent-to-agent trust, context poisoning — isn't covered by traditional AI frameworks that were built for inference-only systems. Ayliea's AI Agent Security framework is scoped specifically to agent deployments: it asks the questions an LLM-application framework can't because the threat model is different.
6 domains AG-1 through AG-6, weighted by deployment risk surface.
Who it's for
- Engineering teams shipping agentic workflows — code-writing agents, customer-service copilots, RPA replacements, MCP-based tool ecosystems
- Security teams reviewing agents that hold user credentials or call external APIs autonomously
- Buyers asking: "What's your agent doing with my OAuth scopes / API keys / customer data?"
What it covers — six domains
- AG-1 Agent Governance & Deployment — approval workflow, risk classification, agent inventory, pre-production review
- AG-2 Delegated Authority & Credentials — OAuth scope limits, API key scoping, user-impersonation boundaries, credential storage
- AG-3 Tool Invocation Security — tool allowlisting, sandboxing, MCP server vetting, argument validation, output filtering
- AG-4 Context & Memory Protection — RAG poisoning resistance, session isolation, long-term memory access controls
- AG-5 Agent Monitoring & Incident Response — action logging, anomaly detection, kill-switch availability
- AG-6 Multi-Agent Orchestration — agent-to-agent trust, message integrity, orchestrator authority limits
How Ayliea ships it
- 26 questions across the 6 domains — focused enough to complete in one working session
- Aligned to MITRE ATLAS 2026.06 AI-agent techniques: AML.T0053 (AI Agent Tool Invocation), T0080 (AI Agent Context Poisoning), T0081 (Modify AI Agent Configuration), T0083 (Credentials from AI Agent Configuration), T0084 (Discover AI Agent Configuration), T0086 (Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation), T0098/T0099/T0100 (tool credential harvesting, tool data poisoning, agent clickbait), and T0103/T0104/T0108/T0110/T0111 (agent deployment, poisoned-tool publishing, tool poisoning, and AI supply-chain reputation inflation)
- Maturity scale 0/3/5/8/10, consistent with other AI-focused frameworks in the platform
- Pairs with OWASP LLM Top 10 (dev-side risks) and ISO 42001 (governance-side risks) for full coverage
Why this matters when you're comparing GRC platforms
Most AI governance comparisons stop at ISO 42001 and NIST AI RMF. This is the framework that distinguishes a practitioner platform from a checklist platform.
No competing GRC platform ships an agent-specific framework — Vanta, Drata, Sprinto all treat AI agents as just "AI systems" under their ISO 42001 or NIST AI RMF coverage, which doesn't ask the agent-specific questions (delegated authority, tool invocation, multi-agent orchestration). This framework exists because procurement teams started asking those questions and customers needed a place to answer them.
Sources
Every numeric claim on this page traces back to the publishing body or the in-app framework definition.
- MITRE ATLAS framework (cross-reference target)
- Ayliea-authored framework definition (our methodology, published openly)
Last verified May 13, 2026.
Other practitioner-focused AI frameworks Ayliea ships
The depth advantage shows up across the set. Each one targets a specific AI risk surface competitors don't cover.